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Abstract 
 
This study complements the scarce literature on growth determinants in fast emerging 
economies of the BRICS and MINT by assessing the determinants throughout the conditional 
distributions of the growth rate and real GDP output for the period 2001-2011. An 
instrumenal variable (IV) quantile regression approach is complemented with Two-Stage-
Least Squares and IV Least Absolute Deviations. The instrumentation process is dynamic.  
The following findings are established. First, while Gross FDI has a negative effect on 
economic growth, the impact of Net FDI is positive, with a higher magnitude in top quantiles 
of the distributions.  Second, the positive effect of natural resources is more apparent in 
countries with low initial growth levels. Third, the impact of telecommunications 
infrastructure is not very significant. Fourth, whereas the incidence of bank credit is positive 
for GDP growth, it is negative for real GDP output. Fifth, while trade openness is positive in 
bottom quantiles of GDP growth, but for the highest quantile in real GDP output, it is 
consistently negative on real GDP output.  Sixth, while the incidence of political stability is 
negative on GDP growth, it is positive on real GDP output, with the  negative (positive) effect 
apparent only in top (bottom) quantiles of GDP growth (real GDP output). Policy implications 
are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 The growing relevance of China in the world and the recent global financial crisis has 
led to an evolving stream of literature on post-Washington Consensus (WC) models. These 
include: a combination of the WC and the Beijing Model (BM) in a development consensus 
(Asongu, 2015a); new development strategies based on a combination of the WC and other 
development models that have successfully advanced developing countries (Fosu, 2013a); the 
false economics of preconditions (Monga, 2014); the need for more self-reliance (Fofack, 
2014); the New Structural Economics which sustains the need for a synthesis between 
liberalism and structuralism (Stiglitz et al., 2013ab; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Norman & Stiglitz, 
2012; Lin & Monga, 2011);  the Liberal Institutional Pluralism
2
 and the Moyo (2013) 
conjecture. Consistent with the Moyo conjecture, economic rights should be given priority at 
the early phase of industrialisation. Hence, the BM should take priority over the WC as a 
short-term development model
3
. This paradigm shift has motivated many developing 
countries to adopt strategies that steer clear of the WC.  
One of such moves is a decision by leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
& South Africa) countries to establish a New Development Bank (NDB) at the recent July 
15
th
 2014  BRICS summit in Brazil, which has led to a plethora of questions in policy and 
academic circles, inter alia: ‘What is the purpose of this BRICS bank? Why have these 
countries created it now? And, what implications does it have for the global development-
finance landscape?’(Desai & Vreeland, 2014).  While these concerns have already been 
substantially engaged (Khanna, 2014; Griffith-Jones, 2014), what is quite apparent is that the 
BRICS would need to maintain a respectable economic growth rate to sustain the ambitions of 
the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and NDB. This brings us to a key question of 
determinants of economic growth in these fast emerging economies. Accordingly, 
understanding drivers of growth in these countries holds several lessons for other developing 
countries.  
But before we engage the concern of understanding these drivers, it is important to 
briefly discuss the NDB and CRA.  According to the narrative, the former or BRICS bank has 
a 50 USD billion initial capital. The bank’s constitution is on equal-basis in terms of voting 
                                                          
2
 The post-WC paradigm focuses on, inter alia: institutions for good public commodity delivery, diversity in 
institutions, and governance conditions for economic growth. More insights into this shift can be found in Fofack 
(2014, pp.  5-9),  Acemoglu et al. (2005), Rodrik (2008) and Brett (2009).  
3
 Moyo has defined the BM as ‘de-emphasised democracy, state capitalism and priority in economic rights’ and  
the WC as ‘liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights’. 
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share because of an equal contribution of 10 USD billion from each of the five signatories. 
The capital-base would be allocated to finance sustainable development and infrastructure 
projects in low- & middle-income nations as well as in the BRICS countries. The CRA of 100 
USD billion is meant to provide more liquidity leverage to member nations in case they are 
faced with balance sheet issues. Contrary to the bank’s capital that is contributed equally 
among member states, the CRA is funded: 41% by China, 18% from Brazil, Russia and India 
and 5% from South Africa.  
 Consistent with the underlying literature on fast growing developing countries (Akpan 
et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015), there are many 
benefits fast economic growth procures, among others: finance, employment and other 
positive externalities from a potentially increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) that is 
associated with appealing trends in managerial expertise, corporate governance and transfer of 
know-how. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
(UNCTAD, 2013), the BRICS and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & Turkey) have been 
representing about 20% of global GDP and more than half of global FDI inflows over the past 
years (e.g 2011 & 2012).  As presented in Table 1 below, during the period 2001-2012, 
growth among the BRICS and MINT nations represented about 19% of world GDP, 
accounted for more than 51% of the population in the world and reflected about 30% of its 
FDI (World Bank, 2013). 
Table 1: Stylized facts on BRICS and MINT 
  
GDP 
(constant 
2005 
US$, 
billions) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2005 
US$) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
FDI net 
inflows 
(BoP, 
current 
US$, 
billions)* 
Population 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
Population, 
total, 
millions 
Natural 
resources, 
Share of 
GDP* 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Brazil 1136.56 5721.23 0.87 0.00 71.54 0.87 198.66 5.72 0.73 
China 4522.14 3348.01 7.80 7.28 280.07 0.49 1350.70 9.09 0.70 
India 1368.76 1106.80 3.24 1.94 32.19 1.26 1236.69 7.36 0.55 
Indonesia 427.47 1731.59 6.23 4.91 19.24 1.25 246.86 10.00 0.63 
Mexico 997.10 8250.87 3.92 2.65 21.50 1.24 120.85 9.02 0.78 
Nigeria 177.67 1052.34 6.55 3.62 8.84 2.79 168.83 35.77 0.47 
Russia 980.91 6834.01 3.44 3.03 55.08 0.40 143.53 22.03 0.79 
South Africa 307.31 6003.46 2.55 1.34 5.89 1.18 51.19 10.64 0.63 
Turkey 628.43 8492.61 2.24 0.94 16.05 1.28 74.00 0.84 0.72 
*2011 data                   
 Source of data: UNDP (2013), World Bank (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
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 In spite of the growing instrumentality of the nine fast developing countries in the 
global econnomy, to the best of our knowledge, very few studies have focused on the BRICS 
and MINT. Most studies have been based on determinants of FDI into these countries. These 
include, papers exclusively focused on the BRICS (Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Jadhav & Katti, 
2012;  Jadhav, 2012) and three studies oriented towards the BRICS and MINT (Akpan et al., 
2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015).  
 In the same vein, as far as we know, only four studies have assessed drivers of growth 
in the underlying countries. Sheng-jun (2011) has investigated education as a driver of growth 
in the BRIC nations to conclude that whereas Russia and Brazil invest relatively more in 
education compared to China and India, growth is stronger in the latter set of countries. Basu 
et al. (2013) on their part have concluded that the potential growth of the BRICS nations 
substantially depends on the capacity of its population to develop skills, especially in the 
working age. Agrawal (2013) has assessed the relationship between FDI and economic 
growth in the BRICS to conclude that there is a long-term relationship running from FDI to 
ecoomic growth. Goel and Korhonen (2011) had earlier addressed three questions in the 
BRIC, notably: “(a) How do medium term growth determinants differ from short term 
determinants? (b) What are differences between growth effects of aggregate versus 
disaggregated exports? And (c) Does lower institutional quality hinder growth?” Their 
findings indicate that, whereas nations of the BRIC have better growth, there are substantial 
within-group disparities. China and Russia for the most part show relatively higher growth, 
India sometimes reflected positive growth while Brazil failed to outpeform the other three 
countries. These disparities in growth naturally caution empirics on growth determinants to 
pay specific attention to high-growth and higher-growth nations.  
 The present line of inquiry complements the above literature in at least three ways. 
First, the determinants of growth are assessed throughout the conditional distributions of 
growth. The intuition for this empirical technique is that growth among fast emerging 
economies may still be contingent on initial growth levels, such that growth determinants are 
different across high- and higher-growth countries. A Quantile regression (QR) estimation 
technique is employed to accommodate  this objective. Second,  MINT countries are added to 
the BRICS, consistent with recent literaure on fast emerging countries (Apkan et al., 2014). 
Third, the concern of endogeneity is addresed by instrumenting the determinants with their 
first-differences and first-lags.  Hence, the instrumentation process is dynamic. Moreover, it 
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extends Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015) who have assessed determinants of FDI in the 
MINT and BRICS using QR and instrumenting only with first lags.  
 The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
methodology. The empirical analysis and results are covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes 
with implications.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We assess a panel of 9 BRICS and MINT countries with data from Apkan et al. (2014) 
for the period 2001-2011. The original sources are the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and World Governance Indicators databases. The adopted periodicity is also 
consistent with a recent stream of literature on FDI determinants in the BRICS and MINT 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015). Two dependent variables 
are used for robustness purposes, notably: GDP growth and real GDP output.  
 Determinants of growth employed in the study which are classified in Table 2 below 
are broadly consistent with the UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014). The retained 
determinants include: Gross FDI, Net FDI inflows, natural resources, infrastructure, private 
credit, inflation, political stability and trade openness. With the exception of high inflation 
that has the potential for decreasing growth, the expected signs from other determinants are 
positive. Accordingly, low and stable inflation is conducive for a positive economic outlook 
(Asongu, 2013a).  
 FDI as a determinant is in line with Agrawal et al. (2014). The inclusion of both Gross 
FDI and Net FDI has a twofold motivation: (a) on the one hand, it is in accordance with the 
underlying FDI literature discussed in the introduction and; (b) on the other hand, it is meant 
to increase subtlety for more policy outcomes. Inflation measured as the annual Consumer 
Price Index and trade openness (annual imports plus exports as a % of GDP) are in 
accordance with Barro (2003). Private domestic or bank credit as a growth determinant is 
consistent with Asongu (2015b) while natural resources (or share of natural resources on 
GDP) and political stability (in estimate) are in line with Tridico (2007) and Fosu (2013b).  
The choice of infrastructure is justified by the fact that, infrastructural development has been 
established to ‘unidirectionally’ cause real output growth in China (Sahoo et al., 2010). The 
use of mobile phones (per 100 people) to proxy for infrastructure is in line with Asiedu (2002) 
and Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis  (2007). 
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Table 2: Classification of Growth determinants 
  
Determining Variables  Examples 
  
Policy variables Tax policy, trade policy, privatization policy, 
macroeconomic policy  
  
Business variables Investment incentives 
  
Market-related economic determinants Market size, market growth, market structure 
  
Resource-related economic determinants Raw materials, labor cost, technology 
  
Efficiency-related economic determinants Transport and communication costs, labor 
productivity  
  
Source: UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
 The summary statisitcs of the variables used in the study is presneted in Table 3 
below. There is a twofold interest for  this table. On the one hand, it reveals that, the variables 
are quite comparable based on their means. On the other hand, it shows that we can be 
confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge owing to  substantial variation in 
the variables.  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics  
 Mean  S.D Min  Max Obs 
      
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (NFDI) 28.979 46.359 -2.977 280.07 99 
Foreign Direct Investment (Gross FDI) 2.402 1.348 -1.855 6.136 99 
GDP Growth (GDPg, annual %) 5.351 3.789 -7.820 14.200 99 
Real GDP (constant of 2005 US billions) (log) 6.346 0.886 4.260 8.341 99 
Infrastructure (Number of mobile phones per 100 people) 52.433 39.220 0.210 179.31 99 
Bank Credit (Private domestic credit on GDP) 85.019 63.492 4.909 201.58 99 
Natural resources (on GDP) 9.003 8.110 0.294 38.410 99 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index, annual %) 8.580 7.519 -0.765 54.400 99 
Trade Openness (Import + Exports on GDP) 0.514 0.128 0.225 0.856 99 
Political Stability (Estimate) -0.826 0.613 -2.193 0.286 99 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 In accordance with the literature on conditional drivers, in order to investigate if intiial 
levels of growth matter in the determinants of growth, we employ a quantile regression (QR) 
approcah, which consists of assessing determinants of economic growth throughout the 
distributions of eonomic growth (Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu, 
2013b). Previous studies on the determinants of growth have reported parameter estimates at 
the conditional mean of economic growth. Some examples discussed in the introduction 
include: (a) Sheng-jun  (2011, p. 190-193)  that is based on  averages and (b) Goel and 
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Korhonen (2011) which is focused on Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Whereas mean 
impacts are important, the adopted QR approach is in line with the motivation of the present 
exposition. That is to say, it asssess how intial growth levels matter in the determinants of 
economic growth. For instance, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) suppose that growth and 
the error terms are normally distributed, the QR strategy is not founded on the assumption of 
error terms that are normally distributed. Therefore, the strategy helps us to assess the drivers 
with particular emphasis on the good and best candidates among the fast growing emerging 
countries. In this light, parameters estimated are shown at several points of the conditional 
distributions of growth (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). This technique therefore incorporates the 
conclusions of Goel and Korhonen (2011) from the BRICS literature discussed in the 
introduction, notably: the need to distinguish  existing growth levels.  
 The QR technique is increasingly being employed in recent development literaure, 
inter alia: corruption (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Billger & Goel, 2009) and health (Asongu, 
2014) studies. A common shortcoming to the underlying applications is the concern of 
endogeneity. We address it by instrumenting the determinants in a twofold or dynamic 
manner. Accordingly, we instrument the determinants with their first lags and first 
differences. The fitted values obtained from the first-stage regressions are used in the second-
stage QR specifications. Below are the two first-stage instrumentation processes.   
 
  titijti xx ,1,,                                                                                                  (1) 
 
  tiititjti xxx ,1,   
                                                                                        
(2) 
 
 
Where: tix ,  
 is a growth determinant for country i
 
at period t ;  is a constant and ti ,  the 
error term.  The instrumentation is based on first lags and first differences in Eq. (1) and Eq. 
(2) respectively.  In the two equations, the estimation processes are based on 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.  
 The second stage of the QR is presented in Eq. (3) below, where the  th quantile 
estimator of economic growth is derived by optimizing the following problem. We present 
Eq. (3) below without subscripts for the purpose of simplicity.  
   






 
 







ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                             (3)
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Where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
the QR procedure consists of minimising the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For 
instance, the 75
th
 or 90
th
 quantiles (with  =0.75 or 0.90 respectively) by weighing the 
residuals approximately. The conditional quantile of economic growth or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (4) 
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th specific quantile.  Consistent with 
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015), this formulation is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the 
OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of 
economic growth. In Eq. (4), while the dependent variable iy  is an economic growth (GDP 
growth or real GDP) indicator, ix  contains: a constant term, Gross FDI, Net FDI, 
infrastructure, trade openness, inflation, private credit, natural resources and political 
stability. For the purpose of robustness, we also report the results for Least Absolute 
Deviations (LAD) using the Gretl Software which should theoretically correspond to results 
of the 0.5
th
 quantile based on the Stata software. It should be noted that contrary to 
mainstream QR findings that are complemented with OLS findings; in this study we have 
complemented QR estimates with 2SLS since the corresponding OLS follows an instrumental 
variable procedure. 
 Specifications in Eq. (4) are tailored to control for overparameterisation and 
multicollinearity issues. For this purpose, the correlation matrix in Table 4 enables the study 
to control for any potential concerns of high degrees of substitution among the instrumented 
independent variables. While Panel A of the correlation matrix is based on first-lag 
instrumentation, the corresponding matrix in Panel B presents them in first difference. From a 
preliminary examination of the correlation coefficients, there does not appear to be ‘high 
degree of substitution’ concerns among the instrumented variables. Hence, we are confident 
that the estimated variables would produce signs that are not biased due to highly correlated 
independent variables entering into conflict.  
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Table 4: Correlation matrix on the loadings  
           
Panel A: Instrumentation with first lags 
           
IVInfra IVInfla IVCredit IVTrade IVPolS IVNres IVFDI IVNFDI GDPg RGDP  
1.000 -0.081 0.234 0.203 0.303 0.273 0.152 0.178 -0.320 0.177 IVInfra 
 1.000 0.010 -0.081 -0.268 0.077 -0.165 -0.278 -0.070 -0.344 IVInfla 
  1.000 -0.140 0.551 -0.490 -0.024 0.162 0.071 0.139 IVCredit 
   1.000 -0.344 0.336 0.246 0.219 0.145 -0.168 IVTrade 
    1.000 -0.240 0.162 0.241 -0.215 0.454 IVPolS 
     1.000 0.052 0.051 -0.084 0.064 IVNres 
      1.000 0.472 -0.037 0.223 IVFDI 
       1.000 0.240 0.711 IVNFDI 
        1.000 0.222 GDPg 
         1.000 RGDP 
           
Panel B: Instrumentation with first difference 
           
IVInfra IVInfla IVCredit IVTrade IVPolS IVNres IVFDI IVNFDI GDPg RGDP  
1.000 -0.122 -0.049 0.024 0.041 -0.008 0.173 0.066 0.019 0.077 IVInfra 
 1.000 -0.238 0.017 -0.058 -0.283 -0.063 -0.212 -0.074 -0.132 IVInfla 
  1.000 0.100 -0.021 0.342 -0.023 0.155 0.052 -0.068 IVCredit 
   1.000 -0.007 0.362 0.184 0.221 0.207 -0.059 IVTrade 
    1.000 -0.147 0.134 -0.089 0.037 -0.069 IVPolS 
     1.000 0.211 0.308 0.207 -0.059 IVNres 
      1.000 0.453 0.257 -0.004 IVFDI 
       1.000 0.453 0.333 IVNFDI 
        1.000 0.222 GDPg 
         1.000 RGDP 
           
IV: Instrumented Variable. Infra: Infrastructure. Infla: Inflation. Credit: Domestic Credit. PolS: Political Stability. Nres: Natural resources.  
FDIgdp: Gross FDI. NFDI: Net FDI.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. RGDP: Real GDP output.  
 
 
3. Empirical results  
 
 In Table 5, we present findings which entail estimations from 2SLS, LAD and QR. 
The 2SLS findings reflect baseline results on mean effects  that we compare with those of 
LAD and various quantiles in the conditional distributions of economic growth. Whereas the 
findings of Panel A are based on the economic growth rate, the dependent variable for Panel 
B is real GDP output. The Left-Hand-Side (LHS) and Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of either 
panels  are based on first-lag and first-difference instrumentation processes respectively. 
Accordingly, Panel A1 (A2) are GDP growth determinants based on first lag (difference) 
instrumentation while Panel B1 (B2) are real GDP output determinants based on first lag 
(difference) instrumentation. All estimaions are robust in standard errors. In the interpretation 
of estimated coefficients, it is important to note that lower quantiles of conditional 
distributions in economic growth denote countries with lower initial growth levels.  
The following findings are observable in Table 5. First, the baseline 2SLS results 
when compared with the corresponding QR estimates are significantly different in terms of 
significance and magnitude. This difference in findings justifies the need to complement 
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2SLS with QR estimates. Second, the instrumental variable (IV) LAD results are consistent 
with the 0.5
th
 quantile across specifications and panels. This implies that the IV LAD results 
obtained from the Gretl software are in line with those of the 0.5
th
 quantile from the Stata 
software.  
Second, Gross FDI has a negative effect on economic growth, with the effect most 
apparent in top quantiles of the growth distribution. The interpretation is consistent across 
specifications and panels. It is interesting to note that the corresponding 2SLS estimates are 
negatively insignificant for the most part.  
Third, the effect of Net FDI is positively significant, consistently for both 2SLS and 
QR estimates. Moreover, the magnitude of significance is higher in top quantiles of the 
growth distributions. This interpretation is broadly consistent across panels and specifications.  
Fourth, on the effect of natural resources, but for a slim exception (2SLS in Panel B1) 
it is broadly positive in the bottom quantiles of the growth rate distributions (0.25
th
 quantile in 
Panel A2 and 0.10
th
 to 0.50
th
 quantiles in Panel B1). It is also interesting to note that the 
decreasing tendency in ‘positive effect magnitude’ in Panel B1 means the positive impact of 
natural resources is more apparent in countries with initial high growth levels, but dissipates 
in higher growth countries.   
Fifth, the impact of infrastructure is not very apparent because of overwhelming 
insignificant estimates. This finding is surprising, given that infrastructure is proxied by 
mobile phone penetration. Accordingly, mobile telephony has been documented to be 
substantially driving growth in developing countries (Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007, p. 37).  
Sixth, the effect of inflation is sparsely significant, notably negative in the:  0.75
th
  
quantile of Panel A1, 0.10
th
  and 0.25
th
 quantiles of Panel B1 and 2SLS, and 0.75
th
  quantile of 
Panel B2. The negative sign is consistent with the expectations of economic theory.  
 Seventh, whereas the incidence of bank credit is positive for GDP growth, it is 
negative on real GDP output.  In Panel A1, the positive effect is apparent in 2SLS, 0.50
th
 and 
0.75
th
 quantiles, while the estimates are insignificant in Panel A2. On the other hand, in Panel 
B, bank credit has a negative effect in the: 0.10
th
 , 0.25
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles   of Panel B1 and 
2SLS and 0.75
th
 quantile of Panel B2. 
Eighth, the effect of trade openness has some significant variations. For GDP 
estimations in Panel A, while it is not consistently significant in Panel A1, it is highly 
significant in the 0.10
th
 and 0.25
th
 quantiles of Panel A2. On the other hand, for real GDP 
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output regressions, the estimations are consistently negative but for the 0.90
th
 quantile which 
is positive in Panel B1, whereas it is not consistently significant in Panel B2. 
Ninth, while the incidence of political stability is negative on GDP growth, it is 
positive on real GDP output. The negative (positive) effect is apparent only in top (bottom) 
quantiles of GDP growth (real GDP output).   
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Table 5: Determinants of Growth  
                 
 Panel A: Determinants of Growth Rate 
                 
 Panel A1: Instrumentation with first lags   Panel A2: Instrumentation with first difference 
 2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90   2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant 3.895** 2.603 2.458 0.725 2.603 5.637*** 4.979  Constant 27.810 81.832 -77.882 35.509 81.832 52.007 83.691 
 (0.042) (0.333) (0.773) (0.788) (0.361) (0.003) (0.337)   (0.559) (0.384) (0.717) (0.457) (0.239) (0.621) (0.467) 
FDI -0.582 -0.302 -0.825 -0.385 -0.302 -0.882** -0.511  FDI 0.169 -0.357 -0.256 1.077 0.357 0.583 -4.00*** 
 (0.332) (0.688) (0.808) (0.631) (0.692) (0.023) (0.497)   (0.765) (0.773) (0.892) (0.109) (0.680) (0.637) (0.007) 
NFDI 0.027*** 0.023 0.027 0.019** 0.023* 0.060*** 0.047***  NFDI 0.051*** 0.068* 0.039** 0.032** 0.068*** 0.054*** 0.050* 
 (0.000) (0.160) (0.312) (0.033) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.087) (0.038) (0.035) (0.000) (0.002) (0.082) 
Nresources 0.040 0.077 0.007 -0.005 0.077 0.078 0.020  Nresources 1.660* -0.281 3.567 2.206** -0.281 -0.025 -0.754 
 (0.398) (0.433) (0.972) (0.936) (0.339) (0.188) (0.894)   (0.066) (0.882) (0.139) (0.031) (0.835) (0.989) (0.512) 
Infrastructure -0.037 -0.018 -0.073 -0.010 -0.018 -0.02*** -0.028  Infrastructure -0.002 0.008 0.022 0.014 0.008 -0.026 -0.033 
 (0.001) (0.268) (0.199) (0.431) (0.195) (0.002) (0.238)   (0.875) (0.728) (0.768) (0.335) (0.684) (0.490) (0.244) 
Inflation -0.088 -0.088 -0.306 0.003 -0.088 -0.107** 0.005  Inflation 0.127 -0.046 0.363 0.223 -0.046 -0.370 -0.012 
 (0.144) (0.489) (0.139) (0.968) (0.333) (0.032) (0.954)   (0.551) (0.884) (0.364) (0.123) (0.857) (0.404) (0.968) 
Credit 0.019** 0.024** 0.027 0.013 0.024** 0.024*** 0.017  Credit -0.455 -0.961 0.266 -0.885 -0.961 -0.432 -0.636 
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.410) (0.256) (0.030) (0.001) (0.186)   (0.379) (0.380) (0.917) (0.127) (0.248) (0.728) (0.627) 
Trade 2.386 -0.146 6.308 3.113 0.146 -2.043 1.788  Trade 7.520 14.396 56.17*** 40.85*** 14.396 -5.175 -0.073 
 (0.446) (0.971) (0.602) (0.498) (0.976) (0.538) (0.849)   (0.466) (0.577) (0.002) (0.000) (0.257) (0.829) (0.996) 
Political Stability -2.154** -3.03*** -1.224 -2.153 -3.032** -4.05*** -3.163**  Political Stability 6.267** 0.2828 11.559 4.790 0.282 -0.028 3.133 
 (0.025) (0.005) (0.727) (0.106) (0.013) (0.000) (0.015)   (0.049) (0.968) (0.279) (0.307) (0.967) (0.997) (0.612) 
R² 0.250 --- 0.254 0.156 0.189 0.260 0.318  R² 0.164 --- 0.387 0.231 0.120 0.109 0.144 
Fisher  4.717*** --- --- --- --- --- ---  Fisher  3.198 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -227.345 -222.069 --- --- --- --- ---  Log-likelihood -232.20 -229.423 --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90  Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
                 
 Panel B: Determinants of Real GDP Output (log) 
                 
 Panel B1: Instrumentation with first lags   Panel B2: Instrumentation with first difference 
 2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90   2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant 7.894*** 7.44*** 8.38*** 7.972*** 7.443*** 7.55*** 7.666***  Constant 31.88** 35.357 13.083 0.006 35.357 42.184** 53.588 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.015) (0.144) (0.315) (1.000) (0.137) (0.012) (0.399) 
FDI -0.154 -0.173 0.121 -0.159 -0.17*** -0.15*** 0.374***  FDI -0.447 -0.981* -0.430 -0.151 -0.981** -1.05*** -1.666*** 
 (0.240) (0.197) (0.450) (0.141) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)   (0.152) (0.085) (0.109) (0.813) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002) 
NFDI 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.01*** 0.025***  NFDI 0.013*** 0.015* 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.020* 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.062) 
Nresources 0.017 0.024 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.002 0.006  Nresources -0.175* -0.240 -0.088 0.080 -0.240 -0.174 -0.115 
 (0.225) (0.150) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.794) (0.476)   (0.093) (0.544) (0.863) (0.879) (0.587) (0.550) (0.906) 
Infrastructure 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.001  Infrastructure 0.003 0.003 0.013* 0.007 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.847) (0.865) (0.786) (0.737) (0.707) (0.499) (0.341)   (0.582) (0.491) (0.074) (0.465) (0.553) (0.596) (0.437) 
Inflation -0.022 -0.010 -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.010 -0.016 -0.013  Inflation -0.058* -0.068 0.078 0.068 -0.068 -0.124** 0.021 
 (0.225) (0.742) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.187) (0.103)   (0.064) (0.371) (0.484) (0.602) (0.442) (0.013) (0.871) 
Credit -0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001* -0.0008  Credit -0.257* -0.277 -0.034 0.074 -0.277 -0.362** -0.483 
 (0.647) (0.664) (0.061) (0.004) (0.230) (0.094) (0.559)   (0.068) (0.326) (0.819) (0.843) (0.329) (0.066) (0.498) 
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Trade -2.28** -2.04** -2.79*** -2.49*** -2.0*** -1.18*** 0.683*  Trade -2.442 -3.038 -1.644 -3.300 -3.038 -1.175 -0.884 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.062)   (0.119) (0.792) (0.889) (0.711) (0.501) (0.652) (0.994) 
Political Stability 0.365 0.289 0.448** 0.414*** 0.289*** -0.005 0.067  Political Stability -0.359 -1.195 5.017*** 0.846 -1.195 -1.092 -0.145 
 (0.146) (0.236) (0.038) (0.004) (0.003) (0.958) (0.418)   (0.791) (0.573) (0.003) (0.756) (0.593) (0.426) (0.967) 
R² 0.675 --- 0.554 0.505 0.463 0.476 0.617  R² 0.107 --- 0.186 0.101 0.138 0.171 0.305 
Fisher  24.14*** --- --- --- --- --- ---  Fisher  2.333** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -61.106 -63.745 --- --- --- --- ---  Log-likelihood -106.636 -106.306 --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90  Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
                 
***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Nresources: Natural Resources. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Growth  is 
least. 2SLS: Two-Stage Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations. FDI: Gross Foreign Direct Investment. NFDI: Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows.  R² is Adjusted for OLS and 
Pseudo for QR (Quantile Regression).  
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4. Concluding implications 
  
 The BRICS and MINT countries represent a substantial force of the global economy 
today. Despite the growing literature on determinants of FDI in these fast growing countries, 
very few papers have focused on their growth determinants. This paper has filled this gap in 
the literature by contributing to the scarce empirical evidence in three ways. First, the 
determinants of growth have been assessed throughout the conditional distributions of growth. 
The intuition for this empirical strategy is that, lessons on growth determinants may be 
contingent on initial growth levels, such that underlying drivers of growth vary between high- 
and ‘very high’-growth countries. Second, MINT countries have been added to a sample of 
BRICS countries to steer clear of previous literature which has been exclusively limited to the 
BRICS. Third, endogeneity-robust instrumental variable (IV) Quantile regression (QR) and 
Two-Stage-Least Squares (2SLS) empirical strategies have been employed, such that the 
instrumentation process is dynamic: in first lags and first differences.  
 The following findings have been established. First, we have observed that the 2SLS 
results are significantly different from the IV QR results. This implies that while mean effects 
may be important, median effects are also very relevant for policy implications. Hence, in the 
investigation of drivers of growth in emerging countries, it is important to account for initial 
levels of growth because blanket policy implications may not be effective unless they are 
contingent on existing growth levels and tailored differently across other high- and higher-
growth nations.  
Second, we have also found that Gross FDI has a negative effect on economic growth, 
with the effect most apparent in top quantiles of the growth distributions. A possible inference 
for this finding is that, in high-growth countries the outflow component of FDI in Gross FDI 
significantly decreases growth in terms of real GDP output and GDP growth rate. Hence, we 
may naturally expect Net FDI inflows to exert positive effects on growth dynamics.  
Third, the effect of Net FDI is positively significant across specifications and panels, 
with the magnitude of positive significance greater in higher growth countries. This finding is 
consistent with the results on effects from Gross FDI. Two points are noteworthy here. On the 
one hand, FDI now exerts a positive effect on high-growth countries because of potentially 
negative effects of FDI outflows. On the other hand, FDI generally has a more significant 
impact in terms of magnitude in higher-growth countries. This inference is logically 
consistent with both the negative effects of FDI outflows and positive impacts of Net FDI 
inflows on growth dynamics. This brings us to the conclusion that, as much as countries with 
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higher initial levels of growth benefit more from inward FDI relative to their low-growth 
counterparts; they are also susceptible to experiencing more deterioration in growth owing to 
outward FDI.  
 Fourth, we have noticed that the impact of natural resources has a positive decreasing 
magnitude. This broadly implies the positive effect of natural resources is more apparent in 
BRICS and MINT nations at the bottom quantiles of the growth distributions. As a policy 
implication, sampled countries need to improve on their management of natural resources 
with increasing economic growth, in order to reverse the decreasing positive trend of growth 
externalities from national resources.  
Fifth, the impact of infrastructure proxied by mobile penetration is not very apparent. 
This finding is contrary to mainstream literature documenting a positive effect of mobile 
phone penetration on economic growth (Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007). A possible explanation for 
this unexpected result could be the low usage of mobile phone for mobile banking activities in 
the MINT and BRICS nations (Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2013). Global averages for ‘mobile 
phone penetration’ (per 100 people), ‘mobile phone used to pay bills’ (% of adults) and 
‘mobile phone used to send/receive money’ (% of adults) are respectively: 90.90, 3. 51 & 
4.71. Corresponding rates in sampled countries are: Brazil (123.2; 1.3; 0), Russia (179.3; 1.7; 
1.5); India (72; 2.2; 0.6); China (73.2; 1.3; 0.6); South Africa (126.8; 4.4; 5.4); Mexico (82.4; 
3.9; 1.5); Indonesia (97.7; 0.2; 0.6); Nigeria (58.6; 1.4; 9.9) and Turkey (88.7; 4.3; 2.2). 
Hence, the comparatively low employment of mobile phone for mobile banking purposes 
could explain its unexpected insignificant relationship with growth dynamics
4
.  
 Sixth, whereas the incidence of bank credit is positive for GDP growth, it is negative 
on real GDP output.  The implication is that while bank credit has a negative impact on the 
macroeconomic measurement of the economy’s size, it has a positive effect on the amount of 
commodities produced in an economy over time. Understanding why the underlying effects 
are conflicting is an interesting future research direction.  
Seventh, we have established that whereas the effect of political stability is negative 
on GDP growth, it has a positive impact on real GDP output. Moreover, the negative 
(positive) effect is apparent only in top (bottom) quantiles of GDP growth (real GDP output).  
This implies that while political stability is positive on real GDP output in sampled countries 
                                                          
4
 The interested reader can find more insights into the statistics on the following link : 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/mobile-banking-who-driver-s-seat 
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with lower initial levels of growth, it is negative on GDP growth in countries with higher 
initial growth levels.  
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